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I. ANNEXATION1
N JNC Partners Denton, LLC v. City of Denton,2 the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals considered an issue of increasing importance in an-
nexation law, the nature of the section 43.052(i) right of a landowner
to compel arbitration when a city refuses to include the land in a three-
year annexation plan.3 JNC Partners is the second case construing this
right since 2005. The other case, Hughes v. City of Rockwall,4 involved a
similar set of facts. In Hughes, the City of Rockwall proposed to annex
two tracts of land owned by the Estate of W.W. Caruth, Jr., of which
Hughes was the sole independent executor. The Estate objected to the
proposed annexations and petitioned Rockwall to include the land in a
three-year annexation plan as provided by section 43.052(c) of the Texas
Local Government Code. After Rockwall denied the request, the Estate
requested arbitration under section 43.052(i) of the Texas Local Govern-
ment Code. The court framed the issue created by these facts as
"whether, under section 43.052(i), the landowner may request and is enti-
tled to arbitration if the municipality refuses to include his land in a
three-year plan." Oral argument before the Texas Supreme Court was
held in Hughes on January 16, 2006. 5
In JNC Partners, JNC petitioned the City of Denton for consent to cre-
ate a water control and improvement district. Denton failed to respond
to this petition, and after two months passed, the city announced its in-
tention to annex roughly 5,900 acres, which included all of the property
* B.B.A. Austin College, M.P.A., J.D., University of Texas; Attorney at Law, Win-
stead Sechrest & Minick P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. This Article covers cases from the Survey period of January 1, 2006 through
February 9, 2007, that the author believed were noteworthy because they added to the
jurisprudence on the applicable subject. The author is indebted to Tommy Mann for his
assistance with the review of cases and drafting portions of this Article.
2. 190 S.W.3d 790 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. granted).
3. Id. at 791.
4. 153 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. filed).
5. Id. at 710-12.
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owned by JNC Partners in accordance with section 43.052(h) of the Texas
Local Government Code. JNC Partners opposed this proposed annexa-
tion and submitted a request to compel arbitration under section
43.052(i) of the Texas Local Government Code. The court determined
that it faced the same issue presented in Hughes, stating "a threshold
question of law in this case is whether a landowner may compel arbitra-
tion under section 43.052(i) when a municipality denies a petition to in-
clude the landowner's property in a three-year annexation plan."'6
Both the City of Rockwall and the City of Denton asserted that a quo
warranto proceeding brought by the state was necessary to challenge the
irregularities in the annexation process claimed by the landowners. How-
ever, the Dallas Court of Appeals in Hughes stated that, if the position
forwarded by these cities was correct, it "would have to read the statute
to provide that a landowner could not actually initiate arbitration. All it
could do is ask."' 7 Refusing to adopt this reading of the statute, the court
opined, "[i]nstead, we read the plain language of the statute to provide
that, if Rockwall fails to take action on the petition to include the area in
the annexation plan, the landowner may request arbitration of the
dispute. "8
In JNC Partners, the court of appeals adhered to the reasoning of
Hughes and denied Denton's argument, based on the statutory language
of section 43.052(i) that the right to arbitrate only arises when the city
"fails to take action on the petition."9 The court rejected Denton's argu-
ment that it had "taken action" on the petition by denying it.1°
The court in JNC Partners went on to consider the issue of "whether
JNC proved a probable right to prevail on its request to compel arbitra-
tion."11 The court answered this question by strictly interpreting the lan-
guage of the statute. Specifically, the court pointed to the language of
section 43.052(i), which states that a "'violation' occurs when a city pro-
poses to 'separately annex two or more areas described by Subsection
(h)(1) if no reason exists under generally accepted municipal planning
principles and practices for separately annexing the areas." 12 Based on
this statutory language, the court concluded that "43.052(i) creates a right
to arbitrate only when the municipality proposes to separately annex
multiple 'areas' in violation of the section. ' 13 Furthermore, because
"Denton proposed to annex but one area," the right to compel arbitra-
tion under section 43.052(i) was not triggered on the facts presented.14
6. 190 S.W.3d at 793.
7. 153 S.W.3d at 713.
8. Id. at 713-14.





14. Id. at 794.
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Justice Walker vehemently rejected the majority's reasoning in her dis-
sent because it created an easy loophole by which municipalities could
circumvent the right to compel arbitrations through serial annexations.
Justice Walker asserted that the majority's construction of the statute
"renders the right to arbitration codified in section 43.052(i) meaningless
because so long as the municipality sequentially annexes each individual
43.052(h)(1) area-never implementing concurrent annexation proceed-
ings for section43.052(h)(1) areas-the right to arbitration is never trig-
gered." 15 The dispute between the majority and the dissent in this case
did not go unnoticed by the Texas Supreme Court, which has granted a
petition for review in the case and should be issuing an opinion in the
near future in conjunction with the Hughes case.
JNC Partners and Hughes involved annexations where the cities re-
fused to comply with the three-year plan. The San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals addressed the situation where the City of San Antonio attempted to
enforce a three year plan. In City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop-
erty Owners Association, Inc.,16 homeowners associations and individual
property owners challenged the validity of a three-year annexation plan
proposed by the City of San Antonio. Pursuant to section 43.0562 of the
Texas Local Government Code, the city held a series of negotiations re-
garding the service plan with representatives from the areas proposed to
be annexed. However, before these negotiations occurred, the Summer-
glen Property Owners Association and some individual landowners re-
quested arbitration under section 43.0564 of the Texas Local Government
Code. The city denied this request for arbitration, stating that it was
"premature because negotiations must be completed before arbitration is
proper under § 43.0564.' 17 The property owners filed suit against the city
for denying their right to compel arbitration, and the trial court ruled in
the property owners' favor, issuing a temporary injunction enjoining the
city and its officials from taking any further steps, in the annexation
process.' 8
On appeal, the city made two principal claims: (1) the property owners
lacked standing to allege a violation of the right to compel arbitration,
and (2) House Bill 585, which
prohibits a municipality with a population of one million or more,
that has operated for at least 10 years under a three-year annexation
plan similar to the plan described in § 43.052, from annexing an area
in its extraterritorial jurisdiction ("ETJ") that is north and east of
I.H. 10 and that is either adjacent to the municipality's boundaries or
within 1 1h miles of a deferred annexation area,' 9
was an unconstitutional "local law." 20
15. Id. (Walker, J., dissenting).
16. 185 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied).
17. Id. at 79.
18. Id. at 79-81.
19. Id. at 80.
20. Id. at 80.
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The city successfully differentiated this case from Hughes in two ways
by arguing,
(i) it has not failed or refused to arbitrate since the arbitration re-
quest by Summerglen prior to commencement of negotiation was
premature, and the City has stated that it was and still is willing to
arbitrate; and (ii) the property owners are not seeking to enforce
their statutory right to arbitration as in Hughes, but rather to pro-
hibit annexation altogether.21
The court of appeals concluded that both of these distinctions were valid,
and noted that "the court in Hughes did not hold that denial of the right
to arbitration renders an annexation without authority, or void, but
merely that a private landowner has standing to sue to compel arbitration
under § 43.0564."22 Thus, "at most, the property owners have standing
only to compel arbitration under § 43.0564."23
Because the court of appeals viewed that resolution of the "constitu-
tionality of [House Bill] 585 was necessary to a determination of whether
the property owners [had] standing," the court of appeals considered the
trial court to have implicitly ruled that House Bill 585 was not an uncon-
stitutional "local law."' 24 Thus, the court of appeals went on to rule on
the constitutionality of House Bill 585. Given the highly specific parame-
ters of House Bill 585, the court of appeals concluded that "[House Bill]
585 singles out a specific geographic area of the City of San Antonio's
ETJ for special treatment without any reasonable basis, and without
other authority in the Constitution, and is therefore a prohibited local
law."' 25 Thus, both of the principal issues raised by the City of San
Antonio were decided in its favor by the court of appeals.26
The petitioning requirements for a voluntary annexation were ad-
dressed in Karm v. City of Castroville.27 Karm petitioned for voluntary
annexation, withdrew the request, and sued the city for violating his
rights under the Municipal Annexation Act. Karm owned about eighteen
acres in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Castroville, and he entered into
negotiations to sell five of the eighteen acres to be developed as a health
club. Karm petitioned for voluntary annexation on March 5, 2004, and
after two public hearings were held, he withdrew his consent for volun-
tary annexation. The city, however, proceeded with the annexation.
When Payne sought a building permit for the health club, it was denied
because the newly annexed property had been zoned residential. 28
Pursuant to section 43.028 of the Texas Local Government Code, "the
21. Id. at 85.
22. Id. at 86.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 88.
25. Id. at 89.
26. Id. at 90.
27. 219 S.W.3d 61 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet. h.).
28. Id. at 63.
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City had thirty days thereafter to grant the petition. '29 The city claimed
that it granted the petition by the act of scheduling a public hearing for
March 22, 2004. The San Antonio Court of Appeals reasoned that "the
fact that the City of Castroville set the dates for a public hearing at a
meeting, without any indication of a deliberative process or an affirma-
tive action as to the petition, does not amount to compliance under sec-
tion 43.028."30 Thus, the court of appeals held that "the trial court erred
in failing to disannex the property."'31
The court of appeals declined to address the appellants' assertion that
their rights to develop the property vested under Chapters 43 and 245 of
the Texas Local Government Code.32 The court of appeals noted that
these provisions apply "after a municipality annexes an area within its
ETJ," and thus, based on the determination "that the City failed to com-
ply with the requirements of Section 43.028, and that the annexation was
void, discussion of the effects after annexation is unnecessary. '33
II. ZONING
The Texas Supreme Court decided two notable cases dealing with zon-
ing issues during the Survey period. The first case, City of Dallas v.
Vanesko,34 involved a sympathetic set of facts. The Vaneskos decided to
build a new house, and "they also decided to design the new structure
themselves, without the assistance of architects and engineers, and act as
their own general contractor. ' 35 Furthermore, the city gave its prelimi-
nary approval of the building plans, and "City inspectors frequently vis-
ited the site without complaint. '36
A problem arose when it became evident that the Vanesko's home was
going to be roughly eight feet higher than the maximum height of thirty
feet allowed under the R-10 zoning district in which the home was lo-
cated. The city inspectors realized this problem, but, instead of ordering
the Vanesko's to halt construction, "recommended that the Vaneskos
seek a height variance from the City of Dallas Board of Adjustment. '37
When the Vaneskos sought this variance, eighty percent of their neigh-
bors, as well as the city staff, openly supported allowing it. The remaining
neighbors did not actively oppose the variance. Nonetheless, the Board
of Adjustment still denied the request.38
By a writ of certiorari, the Vaneskos appealed to the Dallas County
District Court, which granted their appeal. Although the Dallas Court of
29. Id.
30. Id. at 64.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 65.
34. 189 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. 2006).
35. Id. at 770.
36. Id.




Appeals upheld the trial court, the Texas Supreme Court reversed and
upheld the decision of the Board of Adjustment. The case centered on an
interpretation of the Dallas City Code. 39
Section 211.009(a)(3) of the Texas Local Government Code stipulates
that a variance can be granted if it is not contrary to the public interest
and a literal enforcement of the ordinance would create an unnecessary
hardship on the property.40 However, section 51A-3.102(d)(10) of the
Dallas City Code is more restrictive. As the supreme court noted, the
Dallas City Code stipulates that a variance may not be granted to relieve
a "self created or personal hardship," for financial reasons only, or to
permit any person a privilege in developing a parcel of land.
41
Focusing on these more restrictive provisions of the Dallas City Code,
the supreme court reasoned that "it was the way the Vaneskos chose to
design their house that created the hardship about which they now com-
plain, for there was nothing about this parcel of land which required a
roof higher than what the zoning ordinance allowed."'42 As a result of
this reasoning, the supreme court concluded that "the Vaneskos' hardship
is personal and self-created-a condition for which the Dallas zoning or-
dinance prohibits relief."'43
The Vaneskos argued further that "the Board's decision was errone-
ously influenced by the city attorney's instruction that the Board could
not consider whether a permit had been issued in error. . . . -44 The su-
preme court, however, relied on the language of the Dallas City Code,
noting, "the Dallas City Code makes no mention of the particular rele-
vance of a building permit, and we can hardly say the Board abused its
discretion by failing to consider a factor that it was not directed, by ordi-
nance, to consider. .. . -45 Thus, the supreme court upheld the decision of
the Board of Adjustment to deny the Vaneskos' request for a variance. 46
Justice O'Neill dissented based on a concern that "the board of adjust-
ment misunderstood the level of discretion that the ordinance af-
forded."' 47 Justice O'Neill argued that the "evidence that the board in
this case was admonished not to consider is certainly relevant to the ele-
ments" listed in the Dallas City Code. 48 Specifically, Justice O'Neill ar-
gued that the fact that no neighbors opposed the variance provided
"some indication, though not conclusive, that the variance would not be
'contrary to public interest.'" 4 9
Furthermore, the dissent reasoned that "[t]he hardship here was not
39. Id.
40. Id. at 772.
41. Id.





47. Id. (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 775 (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
49. Id. (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
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entirely self-created, as the city inspector was at least equally culpable. '50
Justice O'Neill also pointed out the perceived absurdity of construing the
Dallas City Code to require that no consideration be given to personal
hardship in deciding whether to grant a variance. Rather, Justice O'Neill
argued, "the logical interpretation is that personal hardship cannot be the
sole basis for a variance."'s Based on this reasoning, the dissent would
have remanded the case for the Board of Adjustment's reconsideration. 52
The second notable zoning case decided by the Texas Supreme Court
also involved an erroneously issued building permit. In City of White Set-
tlement v. Super Wash, Inc.,5 3 Super Wash submitted a site plan for ap-
proval by the city staff in order to operate a car wash business. Super
Wash was unaware that the existing zoning ordinance for the property
required the maintenance of a six-foot privacy fence along Longfield
Drive to prevent commercial traffic from spilling over into the adjacent
neighborhood. Super Wash's site plan did not provide for this privacy
fence, but, nevertheless, a city staff member erroneously approved the
plan. Not unsurprisingly, the neighborhood for which the privacy fence's
use was intended brought suit. The trial court granted the city's motion
for summary judgment, and Super Wash appealed. The court of appeals
affirmed all of the trial court's rulings except for the issue of estoppel.
The court of appeals held, "there were issues of material fact regarding
whether the City official's acts were authorized, whether this was the type
of case that required estoppel, and whether the City would be prevented
from exercising its governmental functions if it were estopped from en-
forcing the Ordinance. '54
In addressing these issues, the supreme court began by reciting the gen-
eral rule that "a city cannot be estopped from exercising its governmental
functions. ' 55 The supreme court proceeded to lay the policy basis for this
rule, stating, "the rule derives from our structure of government, in which
the interest of the individual must at times yield to the public interest and
in which the responsibility for public policy must rest on decisions offi-
cially authorized by the government's representatives, rather than on mis-
takes committed by its agents."'56
The supreme court next identified an exception to the general rule
known as the "justice requires" exception, which states that "a municipal-
ity may be estopped in those cases where justice requires its application,
and there is no interference with the exercise of its governmental func-
tions."'57 In construing this exception and summarizing the major cases
applying it, the supreme court stated that the exception involves cases in
50. Id. at 776 (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (O'Neill, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
52. Id. (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
53. 198 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. 2006).
54. Id. at 772-73.
55. Id. at 773.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 774 (quoting City of Dallas v. Rosenthal, 239 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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which, "there [is] evidence that city officials may have affirmatively mis-
led the parties seeking to estop the city and the misleading statements
[result] in the permanent loss of [the plaintiff's] claims against the
cities.'"58
The supreme court refused to apply this exception to the facts of this
case because Super Wash was merely seeking to estop the government
from forcing it to build a second entrance, and as the business had been
"operating for years without this second entrance/exit," there was "noth-
ing in the record to indicate that it [was] necessary for its continued oper-
ation."'59 Furthermore, "the Ordinance was a matter of public record and
discoverable by Super Wash before it purchased the lot."' 60 Super Wash
attempted to counter that the city had benefited by enlarging its tax base
with a commercial business in the area, but the court stated that this ben-
efit was "simply too attenuated.
61
Next, the supreme court considered whether estopping the city in this
case would interfere with the city's ability to perform its governmental
functions. The supreme court began its consideration of this point by nar-
rowing the issue, stating, "in the context of estopping a city's enforcement
of a duly enacted ordinance, the court should consider whether estoppel
will affect public safety, bar future enforcement of the ordinance, or oth-
erwise impede the city's ability to serve the general public."' 62 Because
the fence requirement was injected into the ordinance at the request of
neighboring citizens, the supreme court reasoned that, "estopping the
City would impede the City's attempt to answer the concerns of re-
sidents . "63 Furthermore, the supreme court reasoned that estopping
the city from enforcing the ordinance would "preclude the City from em-
ploying its chosen method of regulating traffic along Longfield Drive and,
thereby, remove some of its discretion in determining how to best protect
the public's safety .... 64 Accordingly, the supreme court ruled that es-
topping the zoning ordinance would interfere with the governmental
functions of the city and reversed the court of appeals.6 5
The other case of note in the area of zoning was decided in the Fort
Worth Courts of Appeals. Teague v. City of Jacksboro66 involved a juris-
dictional issue under section 214.0012(a) of the Texas Local Government
Code. Teague owned property in Jacksboro, Texas and received a notice
from the city requiring him to demolish a structure on his property and
abate all unsafe conditions on the property within thirty days. Instead of
complying with this notice, Teague sued the city claiming that the zoning
ordinance was constitutionally defective. The trial court granted the




62. Id. at 777.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 777-78.
65. Id. at 778.
66. 190 S.W.3d 813 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
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city's plea to the jurisdiction in the suit, determining the following: (1)
section 214.0012 of the Texas Local Government Code requires a writ of
certiorari to be filed within thirty days of the final decision received from
the city, (2) the criteria in this section of the Local Government Code are
jurisdictional prerequisites for obtaining a review of an order of demoli-
tion, (3) compliance with section 214.0012 is a statutory prerequisite to
the waiver of governmental immunity under Chapter 214, and (4)
Teague's failure to file for a writ of certiorari was a fatal jurisdictional
defect to his case. 67 Teague's original petition, filed within thirty days of
the city's decision, did not contain a request for a writ of certiorari, but he
did file a later request for a writ of certiorari outside of the thirty-day
window. 68
The court of appeals initially considered the issue of whether Teague's
filing against the city, without filing for a writ of certiorari, was enough to
trigger the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. In considering this
issue, the court of appeals began by laying out the parameters of section
214.0012 of the Texas Local Government Code. Section 214.0012(a)
states that a landowner must file a petition contesting the legality of a
city's action within thirty days, and section 214.0012(b) states that upon
receipt of this petition, the court "may issue a writ of certiorari .... "69
Based on these provisions, the city contended that, "for its governmental
immunity to be waived under section 214.0012, the statute requires
Teague not only file a verified petition stating the illegality of the City's
decision within thirty days ... but also to request within that same thirty-
day period that the trial court issue a writ of certiorari. '70
Teague's original petition did not request a writ of certiorari or claim
any relief under section 214.0012. The court of appeals considered each
of these two omissions independently in deciding whether Teague had
properly invoked the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. The court
of appeals concluded that Teague's failure to specifically seek relief under
section 214.0012 was not fatal because, in the words of the statute, his
petition "fit the requirements of Section214.0012(a) by 'setting forth that
the decision is illegal, in whole or in part, and specifying the grounds of
the illegality.'-"71
The court of appeals next considered whether Teague's failure to re-
quest a writ of certiorari within thirty days was fatal. The court relied on
the Texas Supreme Court case of Davis v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of
La Porte.72 The court of appeals summarized Davis as standing for the
proposition that, "to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction under [a different
section of the Local Government Code], the plaintiffs need only have
filed a petition challenging the action complained of within the time pe-
67. Id. at 815-16.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 817.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 818-19.
72. 865 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1993).
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riod set forth in the statute. '73 The court of appeals extended this rea-
soning to section 214.0012. The court of appeals reasoned that such a
construction "comports with the plain language of section 214.0012(a),
which requires only that the party 'file ... a verified petition setting for
that the decision [of the city] .. . is illegal' within the thirty-day time
period."'74 Based on this construction of the statute, the court of appeals
held that, "Teague was not required to request issuance of a writ of certi-
orari in his original petition to invoke the trial court's subject matter ju-
risdiction under section 214.0012, and his subsequent request for writ of
certiorari ... was timely."'75
III. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
The Texas Supreme Court ruled adversely to landowners in two inverse
condemnation cases during the Survey period. In Hallco Texas, Inc. v.
McMullen County,76 the supreme court considered a takings claim as-
serted by Hallco, the purchaser of a property intended to be used as a
"Class I nonhazardous industrial waste landfill."'77 Eleven days after
Hallco purchased its property, the McMullen County Commissioners
Court adopted a resolution expressing its opposition to Hallco's proposed
use. Nevertheless, Hallco filed an application to operate an industrial
waste landfill with the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, and
the application was granted. 78
McMullen County then enacted an ordinance prohibiting the disposal
of solid waste within three miles of Choke Canyon Lake, effectively
prohibiting the disposal of industrial solid waste on Hallco's property.
The county derived authority for passing the ordinance from section
364.012 of the Health and Safety Code, which allows a county to prohibit
industrial solid waste disposal in an area as long as it designates another
area in which the waste can be disposed. By the time the ordinance was
passed, Hallco claimed to have invested over $800,000 in the site. In June
1995, Hallco challenged the ordinance in federal district court along with
a parallel proceeding in state court.79
The federal district court dismissed Hallco's claims because it found the
ordinance to be rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose
of protecting the lake as a source of drinking water. The state court
granted the county's motion for summary judgment without specifying
the grounds. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment be-
cause it did not find that Hallco had a cognizable property interest of
which it could be deprived. 80
73. Teague, 190 S.W.3d at 819-20.
74. Id. at 820.
75. Id.
76. 221 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. 2006).
77. Id. at 52.
78. Id. at 53.
79. Id. at 52-54.
80. Id. at 54.
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More than two years after the court of appeals' verdict, and slightly less
than six years after the ordinance was passed, Hallco requested a vari-
ance from the requirements of the ordinance. After a hearing, the county
took no action on the request. Hallco subsequently filed another lawsuit
in which it:
expressly disavowed any challenge to the ordinance's validity. In-
stead, Hallco alleged that bydenying its variance request the County
had taken, damaged, or destroyed Hallco's property for public use in
violation of article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution. Hallco
also alleged that the County had taken its property without just com-
pensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 81
The county again moved for summary judgment alleging, "that Hallco
had no constitutionally protected property right to use its land for solid
waste disposal, and that even if it did, the County reasonably exercised its
police power."18 2
The supreme court characterized Hallco's position as contending that
"a landowner always has a reasonable investment-backed expectation in
pursuing a development project that was lawful when the land was pur-
chased and need not demonstrate that it has secured all necessary permits
in order to pursue a takings challenge. '8 3 Furthermore, Hallco claimed
that, "the ordinance decreased the value of its property by ninety-nine
percent and it had a distinct investment-backed expectation that it would
be able to use its property to operate a solid-waste disposal facility when
it received its permit from the Commission. '84
The supreme court ultimately decided the issue based on the principle
of res judicata. 85 Hallco attempted to argue that the doctrine of res judi-
cata did not apply "because Hallco's claim in the previous suit was a fa-
cial constitutional challenge to the ordinance while this suit challenges
the County's particular application of the ordinance to its property, and
its as-applied takings claim was not ripe in Hallco I because it had not
sought a variance from the ordinance. '86
The supreme court rejected Hallco's argument because:
this was a no zoning ordinance; the ordinance here prohibited pre-
cisely the use Hallco intended to make of this property, and nothing
in the ordinance suggested any exceptions would be made. Hallco's
taking claim was ripe upon enactment because at that moment the
"permissible uses of the property were known to a reasonable degree
of certainty. '8 7
81. Id. at 55.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 57.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 58.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 60 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001)).
2007] 1399
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Even though it was styled as a "variance request," the supreme court rea-
soned that "Hallco's request was nothing more than a demand for the
County to reconsider what had been its position all along."' 88 As such,
the supreme court held, "Hallco's facial and as-applied challenges were
the same regardless of how Hallco chose to frame its pleadings, and res
judicata bars another bite at the apple." 89
Hallco attempted to assert further that its Fifth Amendment takings
claim was not barred in the same manner as the facial challenge, but the
supreme court cited the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Allen v. McCurry,90 which required "all federal courts to give preclusive
effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from
which the judgments emerged would do so."91 As a result, Hallco's claim
in Hallco II was deemed barred by the ruling in Hailco 1.92
The majority ruling sparked a vigorous and lengthy dissent from Jus-
tices Hecht, Medina and Willett. In the dissent, the justices harped on the
issue of ripeness. The dissenting justices agreed that Hallco's facial chal-
lenge was not ripe. However, the justices pointed to the United States
Supreme Court case of Williamson County Regional Planning Commis-
sion v. Hamilton Bank,93 in which the Court held, "an as-applied claim is
not ripe until the regulatory authority has made a final decision regarding
the application of the regulation to the property," in contending that
Hallco's as-applied challenge was not ripe until its request for a variance
was denied.94
The dissenters pointed out the "embarrassing fact" that the county had
argued during Hallco I that it "'had the authority to grant a variance, or
even to rescind the ordinance, if Hallco presented sufficient justification,'
and therefore Hallco's action was not ripe because it 'had not obtained a
final decision from the County."' 95 Given that the county had made
these representations to Hallco during the first litigation, the dissenting
justices viewed the case as one that '"illustrates how the government can
use this ripeness requirement to whipsaw a landowner. '96 The dissent in-
sisted that the supreme court should have "tak[en] the County at its word
and remand[ed] the case for proceedings on the merits ... .
Another example of the Texas Supreme Court restricting the scope of
private property rights is City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Part-
ners.98 In 1999, the City of San Antonio began taking action to block
access from the driveway for a business park to a city street. TPLP devel-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
91. Id. at 96.
92. Hallco, 221 S.W.3d at 62.
93. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
94. 221 S.W.3d at 63 (quoting 473 U.S. at 186).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 64.
98. 218 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. 2007).
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oped an office park fronting on 1-10 in San Antonio. There was limited
access to 1-10, and the plat for the office park showed a driveway con-
necting to Freiling Drive. In response to neighborhood complaints about
increased traffic on Freiling, the city decided to close the street/access
connection. The owner of the private driveway filed suit, seeking a de-
claratory judgment and an injunction preventing the city from blocking
the driveway's access to the street. The trial court, "rendered judgment
declaring that (1) the attempted closure of the Freiling Drive street/access
[was] an unreasonable exercise of the City's police power; .. .[(2)] clo-
sure of the Freiling Drive street/access would result in a compensable tak-
ing of the property rights of TPLP; and [(3)] the City was estopped as a
matter of law from closing the street/access." 99 "The court of appeals
affirmed."10 0 The supreme court reversed, holding that the city's decision
and actions to close access between the private driveway and the street
constituted a proper exercise of the City's police power, and closing the
access would not constitute a compensable taking.1 01
The supreme court first addressed the standard of review applicable to
the city's ordinances and other actions in limiting vehicular access to Frei-
ling Drive via the driveway. "Under the rational relationship standard,
the City's decisions must be upheld if evidence in the record shows it to
be at least fairly debatable that the decisions were rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest. ' 10 2
"The City argue[d] that closure of access to Freiling [was] related to at
least two governmental interests: safety and separating commercial traffic
from a residential neighborhood to improve the residents' quality of
life"1 0 3 Although TPLP presented evidence at the supreme court hearing
that the driveway did not create a safety hazard, the supreme court noted
that evidence was introduced that "closure of access to Freiling would
separate commercial traffic from residential" traffic, and "improve the
quality of life for ... residents along Freiling. ' ' 10 4
With respect to the denial of access issue, the supreme court stated
that, "access to a business was not materially and substantially impaired
when one access point was closed, but another access point on a public
street remained unaffected."' 1 5 The supreme court further noted that,
"[i]f the access to Freiling [was] closed, at least six points of egress and
ingress along the 1-10 access road [would] remain at the front of the busi-
ness park. °1 0 6 Even though the remaining access points were inconve-
nient, there was not a substantial impairment of access and no inverse
99. Id. at 61-62.
100. Id. at 63.
101. Id. at 62.
102. Id. at 65.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 64.
105. Id. at 66 (citing Archenhold Auto Supply Co. v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 111, 114(Tex. 1965)).
106. Id. at 66.
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condemnation. 107
"Finally, the City argue[d] that the trial court and-[the] court of appeals
erred in holding that the City was estopped from closing the driveway's
access to Freiling.' 10 8 With regard to estoppel, the court stated:
in exceptional cases a city may be estopped from taking certain ac-
tions where circumstances demand application of the doctrine to pre-
vent manifest injustice. But, even if doing justice would otherwise
warrant applying principles of estoppel, courts will not apply the doc-
trine if doing so interferes with a city's ability to perform its govern-
mental functions.10 9
TPLP argue[d] that justice require[d] application of the doctrine of
estoppel in this case because the City approved the driveway by ap-
proving the plat depicting [it] in 1975, and it relied on the plat to
confirm access to the property when it decided to purchase the prop-
erty and spend over $1 million on improvements. 110
Although "these facts depict[ed] a situation where doing justice might
warrant application of estoppel principles," '' the supreme court ruled
that estopping a city from employing its chosen method to regulate traffic
would improperly interfere with the city's performance of its governmen-
tal functions. 1 12 As a result, the city was not estopped from closing the
driveway." 3
City of Dallas v. Blanton 14 addressed whether a city mandate to own-
ers of older buildings to reroute on-site plumbing lines to new service
lines installed by the city was a regulatory taking. The City of Dallas
implemented a plan to replace old, substandard sewer mains located un-
derneath and at the back of the properties in the Deep Ellum area. As
part of the plan to install the new lines, the building owners would have
to reroute their plumbing at their expense to hook into the new service
lines. The building owners demanded that the city reroute the plumbing
at the city's expense. When the city refused, the building owners sued in
inverse condemnation. The city appealed the trial court's denial of its
plea to the jurisdiction.1 5
The Dallas Court of Appeals noted that, "[a] governmental action can
cause a physical invasion of property that rises to the level of a constitu-
tional taking even though it may not physically appropriate the prop-
erty.' 16 The court of appeals held that, "the evidence submitted did not
raise a fact issue on physical taking" because "there was no claimed dam-
107. Id. at 67.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 774 (Tex.
2006)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 67.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 200 S.W.3d 266 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet. h.).
115. Id. at 270.
116. Id. at 272.
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age other than having to pay to reroute the plumbing. ' 117 As a result, the
court of appeals held that there was no evidence of a physical taking. 118
The building owners also contended that the city's requirement "consti-
tute[d] a regulatory taking because it caused a direct and substantial in-
terference with [the] use and enjoyment of their properties."' 19 The
court of appeals focused on the Texas Supreme Court analysis in Sheffield
Development Co., Inc. v. City of Glenn Heights,120 which included (1) the
economic impact[ ],(2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with
investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the governmen-
tal action.' 121 Based on the market value of the properties, the required
rerouting would decrease the value of the properties by only 2.75-9%.
The court of appeals held that was not a significant adverse economic
impact. 122
The building owners also argued that there was an investment-backed
expectation that the city would pay for this cost because the Dallas City
Code stated that when a substandard main was replaced, the city would
"transfer and reconnect existing service connections. ... "1123 The court of
appeals agreed with the city's interpretation that the phrase simply meant
that the city could not refuse to reconnect service when it relocated a
main, not that it must reroute the plumbing at city expense.1 24 As a re-
sult, there was no "reasonable [investment-backed] expectation that the
City would pay to reroute their plumbing because of city ordinances. 1 25
With respect to the character of governmental action, the building own-
ers argued, "the City exercised poor planning by allowing buildings to be
constructed over the old main. 1 26 It was undisputed, however, that Dal-
las did not relocate the old main to take advantage of the appellees. Fur-
ther, "a city's decision on whether and how to repair a sewer is a
governmental function for which the city enjoys governmental immu-
nity."'21 7 As a result, "appellees did not allege a valid taking claim, and
the City's sovereign immunity was not waived."1 28
Whether or not a city can force a developer to waive an inverse con-
demnation claim was addressed during the Survey period in Sefzik v. City
of McKinneyi 29 The Texas Supreme Court ruling in Town of Flower
Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. Partnership130 held that a development
117. Id. at 273.
118. Id. at 273.
119. Id.
120. 140 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2004).
121. Blanton, 200 S.W.3d at 274 (citing Sheffield Dev. Co., Inc. v. City of Glenn
Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 672-73 (Tex. 2004)).
122. Id. at 275.
123. ld. at 277.





129. 198 S.W.3d 884, 892 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet. h.).
130. 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004).
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exaction can be unconstitutional.13 1 Many cities require that a developer
sign an agreement to develop an approved subdivision. A city will take
the position that this "agreement" amounts to a waiver of the developer's
right to complain about the city's constitutional violation.
In Sefzik, the Dallas Court of Appeals rejected this position by ruling
that the developer in that case did not waive its right to file suit by signing
such an agreement. 132 The developer of Sefzik's land was required to
either build an off-site road or pay the city almost $270,000 in escrow as a
condition to development. The development would not even have direct
access to the road if and when it was ever built.133
After the development was completed, the property owners (who had
been assigned the claims against the city by the developer) filed suit
against the city. The trial court ruled in favor of the city and held that the
developer had waived its right to complain about the constitutional viola-
tion. The court of appeals rejected the city's waiver argument, recogniz-
ing that finding a waiver in this situation would be the same as imposing a
requirement that the developer file suit before accepting development ap-
proval. The court of appeals rejected the city's argument that the
"choice" between two alternative exactions somehow made the devel-
oper's agreement voluntary:
We conclude that choosing between alternative exactions does not
bar a later challenge to the government's imposition of either exac-
tion as being a regulatory taking. If it did, then governmental enti-
ties could avoid any exposure to exaction takings claims merely by
structuring its regulations to exact one of two (or more) alternatives
and requiring the landowner to chose its position.134
Another appellate decision which found a taking of private property
rights is City of San Antonio v. El Dorado Amusement Co.135 El Dorado
owned a building which had been used for several years "as a bar, pool
hall, and club, always selling alcoholic beverages.'' 136 The property was
rezoned in 1999 to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages. El Dorado
then "applied for a non-conforming use to operate a bar with on-premises
alcoholic consumption."' 137 After the city denied the request, El Dorado
appealed to the Board of Adjustment. Following an adverse decision by
the Board, El Dorado filed a takings claim against the city.138
Because El Dorado's property was not physically taken, [the San
Antonio Court of Appeals] determine[d] whether the City imposed
restrictions that either (1) denied El Dorado all economically viable
use of its property, or (2) unreasonably interfered with El Dorado's
131. Id. at 623.
132. Sefzik, 198 S.W.3d at 895.
133. Id. at 889.
134. Id. at 894.
135. 195 S.W.3d 238 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
136. Id. at 243.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 243.
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right to use and enjoy its property. Determining whether all eco-
nomically viable use of a property has been denied entails a rela-
tively simple analysis of whether value remains in the property after
the governmental action. 139
The court of appeals found that value still remained in the property. 140
Next, [the court of appeals] determine[d] whether the government
unreasonably interfered with the landowner's right to use and enjoy
the property. This determination requires a consideration of two fac-
tors: the economic impact of the regulation and the extent to which
the regulation interferes with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions. The first factor merely compares the value that has been taken
from the property with the value that remains in the property....
The second factor is the investment-backed expectation of the land-
owner. "The existing and permitted uses of the property constitute
the 'primary expectation' of the landowner that is affected by regula-
tion."' 41 Knowledge of existing zoning is to be considered in deter-
mining whether the regulation interferes with investment-backed
expectations. There [was] no dispute that El Dorado had a license to
sell alcohol for on-premises consumption. In fact, prior to the rezon-
ing, the property had always been operated as a business that served
alcohol. 142
With respect to the adverse economic impact, the owner had invested
$800,000 in the building and property. For about ten to fifteen years, El
Dorado leased the property to the same tenant for $10,000 per month.
After the downzoning, El Dorado leased the property for two months at
$3,000 per month. The property earned more income and higher profits
when it operated with a license to sell alcohol. In January 2003, El Do-
rado sold the property for $418,000.143
The court of appeals:
conclude[d] this evidence support[ed] a finding that the enactment of
the rezoning ordinance had a severe economic impact on El Do-
rado's business and unreasonably interfered with El Dorado's invest-
ment-backed expectations. Therefore, [the court of appeals] held
that a compensable regulatory taking resulted from the City's rezon-
ing of El Dorado's property and the taking caused El Dorado's
damages.1 44
IV. IMPACT FEES
In DeSoto Wildwood Development, Inc. v. City of Lewisville, 145 the city
required the escrow of funds on roadway construction for a proposed res-
139. Id. at 245 (citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 935 (Tex. 1998)).
140. Id. at 246.
141. Id. (quoting Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 936).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 246-47.
144. Id. at 247.
145. 184 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet. h.).
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idential subdivision. Following the city's rejection of the developer's de-
mands for reimbursements of the escrowed funds, the developer sued for
violations of the Texas Impact Fee Act (Chapter 395 of the Texas Local
Government Code) and inverse condemnation under the Texas and
United States Constitutions. 146
The first question addressed by the trial court was whether the es-
crowed funds were "impact fees" under Chapter 395. According to the
city, the escrowed funds were not impact fees in accordance with the ex-
ception in section 395.001(4)(B) of the Texas Local Government Code,
which applies to the construction of on-site facilities that is "required by a
valid ordinance and is necessitated by and attributable to the new devel-
opment.' 1 47 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
holding on behalf of the city. Following the plain reading of the statute,
the court of appeals held that the escrowed fees were "impact fees" that
were not enacted as required by the statute. 148
Unfortunately for the developer, he waited until after all of the lots in
the development were sold before filing the suit to recover the funds.
Section 395.025(E) of the Texas Local Government Code provides that a
refund shall be paid to the record owner at the time the refund is paid.
Because the developer no longer owned any of the property in the subdi-
vision, the court of appeals held that there would be no recovery of the
escrowed funds. 1 49
The developer also brought a breach of contract action stating that the
developer had not lived "up to its agreements regarding the use of the
impact fees."'150 Initially, the court of appeals held that the city did not
have sovereign immunity against developer's contract claims. The lan-
guage in section 51.075 of the Texas Local Government Code authorized
the filing of the breach of contract action.151
However, the court of appeals agreed with the city that the developer
had not exhausted its administrative remedies prior to filing suit. While
the city's attorney sent a letter rejecting the developer's demands, the city
council did not vote on the matter. 152 In addition, the court of appeals
held that the developer's constitutional takings claims were not ripe be-
cause all administrative remedies were not exhausted. 53 Therefore, the
court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court with instructions
that the trial court abate its proceedings to afford the developer the op-
portunity to have the city council vote on the issue.154
146. Id. at 818-19.
147. Id. at 819-20.
148. Id. at 821.
149. Id. at 822.
150. Id. at 824.
151. Id. at 824-25.
152. Id. at 825.
153. Id. at 827.
154. Id. at 826.
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